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I1
Failure to Exploit Evidence
Tending to Discredit WitnessGrounds for Reversal?
Appellant's conviction of murder in the
first degree was based primarily upon the
testimony of his co-defendant who was
adjudicated insane subsequent to trial.
Moving for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, appellant contended that the inability of the jury to consider his co-defendant's long history of
mental illness (and subsequent adjudication
of insanity) in reaching their verdict had
constituted prejudicial error. The Court
of Appeals reversed the order denying the
motion and held that, in view of the gravity
of the offense involved and in the interests
of justice, the jury was required to consider the mental condition of the material
witness on the issue of his credibility.
People v. Rensing, 14 N.Y.2nd 210, 199
N.E.2d 489, 250 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1964).
For more than one hundred years the
courts have recognized that a witness suffering from mental illness is not absolutely
barred from testifying in both criminal, and
civil 2 cases. Such testimony is deemed ad-

missible if the judge finds that the witness
has sufficient intelligence to accurately relate the events in question." Indeed, the
capacity of an adult to act as a witness is
presumed. 4

Upon motion

of

either

the

prosecution or the defense, however, the
question of a witness' mental capacity to

1 Regina v. Hill, 2 Den. 254, 169 Eng. Rep. 495

(Cr. Cas. 1851).
2 Rivara v. Ghio, 3 E.D. Smith 264 (N.Y.C.P.
1854).
3 District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U.S. 519
(1882).
4 Aguilar v. State, 279 App. Div. 103, 108 N.Y.S.
2d 456 (3d Dep't 1951); 2

§ 497 (3d ed. 1940).
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testify may be put in issue5 and decided
by the court as a matter of law.' The trial
court's finding is not subject to reversal except where an abuse of discretion is shown.'
Even when the question of a witness' capacity to testify is not put in issue by counsel, evidence of the witness' mental condition is admissible on the issue of credibility
so that the jury may consider what weight
is to be given to the witness' testimony."
It is quite possible that a jury's determination would be affected by its knowledge of
the witness' actual state of mind. 9 Since the
jurors are the sole judges of a witness' credibility,' 0 information which will assist them
in rendering a correct decision should properly be developed by the trial counsel. This
includes the burden of conducting the
cross-examination and marshalling the evidence which will serve as the basis for the
attack on the credibility of the witness., 1
In People v. Salemi,2 the quality of the
trial counsel's tactics, including the art of
cross-examination, was an important factor
in the final determination of the case. Counsel for the defendant had moved for a new
trial on the grounds of newly discovered
5 See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
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§§ 487, 497 (3d ed.

1940).
1Henderson v. United States, 218 F.2d 14 (6th
Cir. 1955).
8 Barker v. Washburn, 200 N.Y. 280, 93 N.E.
958 (1910); Note, The Mentally Abnormal:
Challenges to His Competency and Credibility,
13 RUTGERS L. REV. 330 (1958).
9 4 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE § 723
(1914); see generally People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.
2d 554, 136 N.E.2d 853, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885
(1956).
10Wright v. Southern Exp. Co., 80 Fed. 85
(W.D. Tenn. 1897); People v. Peller, 291 N.Y.
438, 52 N.E.2d 939 (1943).
11 State v. Downs, 50 La. Ann. 694, 23 So. 456
(1898).
12 309 N.Y. 208, 128 N.E.2d 377 (1955).
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evidence, claiming that the state's star witness who had positively identified the defendant as the felon was discovered to be
mentally incompetent subsequent to defendant's conviction. The court denied the
motion for a new trial on the ground that
defense counsel had adequately apprised
the jury of the witness' mental instability,
although the actual finding of insanity occurred after trial. The court deemed the
defense counsel's reference to the witness'
attempt to commit suicide by banging his
head against the cell bars as sufficient
notice to the jury of the witness' mental
state. In addition, the defense counsel's
summation repeatedly referred to the witness as "the man that purposely banged his
head against the bars."' 3 The court reasoned that the "newly discovered evidence"
of actual insanity did not present the issue
of credibility in a new light and "was not
new matter at all, but had been before the
court and jury. . . . 14 Judge Fuld's dissent
in Salemi was based on the premise that the
jury had not had sufficient evidence before
it as to the witness' mental state. Since the
witness was found insane after trial, Judge
Fuld concluded that the jury never really
had an opportunity to hear and weigh the
evidence sufficiently in order to convict.
My view is simply that the original jury, or
another, could reasonably and conscientiously have reached a verdict contrary to
the one that was reported, on the basis of
the matter recently uncovered and not adducible by the defense at the time of the
original trial.' 5

'3

d. at 212, 128 N.E.2d at 379.

14 Ibid. See also People v. Priori, 164 N.Y. 459,
58 N.E. 668 (1900); cf. Markert v. Long Island
R.R., 175 App. Div. 467, 161 N.Y. Supp. 926

(1st Dep't 1916).
15 People v. Salemi, 309 N.Y. 208, 227-28, 128

N.E.2d 377, 389 (1955) (dissenting opinion).

The instant case, however, presented a
fact pattern sufficiently different from that
in Salemi, so as to render the latter case
not controlling. Here the witness' mental
condition was not put in issue during the
trial and though some evidence was presented to the effect that the witness had
suffered a brain injury and had spent some
time in private sanitariums," o the jury was
not directly apprised of the witness' mental
condition at the time of trial.17 In Salemi,
however, the trial counsel's repeated references to the witness' attempt at suicide immediately prior to trial was deemed sufficient to directly apprise the jury of the
witness' mental condition at the time he
had testified.
Thus, in Rensing, the majority reasoned
that the subsequent adjudication of the witness' actual insanity constituted "newly discovered evidence" which should properly
be submitted for the jury's consideration
in reaching their verdict.' This reasoning
was supported by additional circumstances.
Defendant had repudiated his confession
and the only evidence which pointed to defendant's guilt other than the witness' testimony was defendant's possession of the
murder weapon. In this setting the witness'
testimony assumed monumental impor"GPeople v. Rensing, 14 N.Y.2d 210, 215, 199
N.E.2d 489, 492, 250 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (1964)

(dissenting opinion).
Indeed, the trial court remarked during the
argument of the new trial application that the
material witness' demeanor in the courtroom and
on the witness stand furnished no basis for inferring that there was something mentally wrong
with him. Id. at 212, 199 N.E.2d at 490, 250
N.Y.S.2d at 403.
18 In Salemi, the subsequent finding of the witness' insanity did not constitute "newly discovered evidence" since such a finding was regarded
as merely cumulative and would not have changed
the jury's verdict. The jury had sufficient notice
of the witness' mental instability at trial.
17

11
tance. The majority could not, in retrospect, determine how the jury would have
reacted with knowledge of the actual mental condition of the material witness. Accordingly, the majority declared the necessity for a new trial in the interests of justice.
The majority, however, failed to scrutinize the defense counsel's trial tactics in
the instant case. It might have been found,
for example, that counsel did not exploit
to the fullest extent the evidence that had
been presented to the jury. The evidence
revealed that the witness had sustained a
brain injury many years previous to trial
and had been institutionalized on several
occasions. Counsel, however, did not even
attempt to discredit the witness' testimony
on cross-examination. When defendant's
counsel sought to have the witness' mother
testify as to the witness' mental incompetency and the trial court refused to allow
such testimony, defendant's counsel was
reminded by the court that he could produce medical testimony on that issue. Defendant's counsel, however, did not proceed
further, thereby impeding the jury's full
consideration of the witness' credibility.
The apparent incongruity which arises from
a comparison of the instant case with
Salemi is that defendant is here benefited
by his counsel's failure to sufficiently question the credibility of the material witness.
In Salemi, on the other hand, the defense
counsel's astute attack on the material witness' credibility subsequently precluded
defendant from obtaining a new trial.
The majority in the principal case does
not appear to have sufficiently inquired into
whether the defense counsel's failure to directly question the mental competency of
the witness was due to strategy or inadvertance. By leaving this question open,
the majority's decision is implied author-
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ity for the view that a counsel's conduct,
at least in cases where the death penalty
is invoked, will not affect the rights of
his client in obtaining a new trial where
the material witness is subsequently found
to be insane.' 9 With this in mind, counsel
for a defendant may purposely withhold an
attack on a material witness' mental condition in order to reserve a ground whereby
a new trial might be obtained. A diligent
counsel, however, who proceeds to question a material witness' mental condition
risks the possibility that a subsequent adjudication of insanity will not be considered
"newly discovered evidence" but rather
"merely cumulative" evidence. Instead, the
majority focused upon the impairment of
a jury's consideration of a witness' credibility in reaching its verdict. If the material
witness was insane at the time of trial his
reasoning process may have been impaired.' - Since it is not feasible to determine a witness' mental competence from
his mere composure at trial,21 the jury's
awareness of his inability would be requi22
site to a fair and impartial trial.
The dissent in the instant case rejected
the majority's view on the ground that a
new trial should not be granted simply

11Itshould be noted that we are not dealing with
a situation wherein the defense counsel has been
grossly negligent in defending his client. In such
a case, a new trial would be required on the
grounds of due process.
20 Doctors, who had examined the co-defendant
when he first was admitted to an institution, discovered that he was a paranoid. A paranoid suffers
from perverted and illogical ways of thinking
"upon matters even apart from those outwardly
connected with the delusions." GLUECK, MENTAL
DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 367 (1925).
See note 17, supra.
Cf. People v. Buchalter, 289 N.Y. 181, 45
N.E.2d 225 (1942); People v. Becker, 210 N.Y.
274, 104 N.E. 396 (1914).
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because one defense attorney pursues different trial tactics than another. 23 Judge
Burke would not distinguish the instant
case from Salemi, since defense counsel
here had sufficient opportunity to introduce medical testimony as to the witness'
condition. In addition, counsel could have
attacked the witness' credibility, as the
defense counsel had done in Salemi, by
cross-examination. The jury would then be
apprised, in greater detail, of the evidence
that was before it.24 Consequently, Judge
Burke reasoned that the witness' testimony
was merely cumulative and the jury's ver25
dict would not be different at a new trial.
The decision in the instant case reiterates the well-settled rule that the jury must
be allowed to determine the credibility of
witnesses.2 6 With regard to whether a new
trial should be granted, the decision adheres to the general rule that the court has
to determine what effect the omitted evidence would have had upon the final determination of the case. 27 Difficulty is
encountered when, as in the case at bar,
the attorney presents pertinent information
to the jury at the trial but does not take
advantage of it by utilizing fully the ordinary methods of attacking a witness' credibility. Does the attorney's duty to inform
the jury of evidence which might have a
Accord, Hendrickson v. State, 233 Ind. 241,
118 N.E.2d 493 (1954).
24 Cf. United States v. Duhart, 269 F.2d 113 (2d
Cir. 1959); People v. Lee, 4 App. Div. 2d 770,
165 N.Y.S.2d 338 (2d Dep't 1957), afj'd, 4
N.Y.2d 843, 150 N.E.2d 241, 173 N.Y.S.2d 815
23

(1958).
25 People v. Hovey, 30 Hun 354, 1 N.Y. Crim.
324 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 93 N.Y. 651, 1 N.Y. Crim.
477 (1883).
26 United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951).
27 See 5 JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE
§ 815 (1914).

direct bearing on the witness' credibility
rest solely with the attorney? Must the
court perform this duty if counsel fails to
do so? Would it be reversible error if
neither the trial court nor the attorney had
sufficiently presented to the jury fully developed evidence that bears upon a witness'
credibility?
It would appear that a defense counsel's
failure to attack the credibility of a material witness by not developing the issue
of mental competence, does not thereby
preclude the judge himself from informing
the jury that mental incompetence has
bearing on a witness' credibility. The trial
judge generally has the right to question
the witness in a reasonable and impartial
28
manner in order to elicit pertinent facts.
In so doing, however, he should refrain
from indicating his doubt as to the credibility of the witness. A judicial attempt
to discover or present additional evidence
to the jury might well result in the judge's
disparagement of the witness. Thus, the
guarantee of judicial indifference with respect to all witnesses testifying would be
lost.2 9 Since the court does not have the
requisite machinery for discovering sources
of information not presented by the parties
which will have a bearing on the witness'
capacity and credibility, it would be well to
rely on the zeal and self-interest of the
parties and their lawyers to evoke all information which is necessary for a fair and
proper verdict. If the attorney fails in this
endeavor, the court may refuse to grant a

Ibid.
"In the interest of fairness, the trial judge
should refrain from examining witnesses unless
it becomes necessary for clear understanding of
an issue involved." ANDERSON, WHARTON'S
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2027 (1957).
28
29

11

new trial. 31 Courts also recognize, however,
that there is a level below which the actions
of the attorney cannot fall or the due process requirement will be violated.",
Upon a defendant's conviction, the defense counsel might well be expected to attempt to secure a new trial. However, the
state cannot be expected to provide a
forum when mere bad judgment of counsel,
or a failure of trial tactics, has resulted in
the defendant's evidence on the main trial
not being adequately introduced or exploited.32

If the Court in the instant case had
allowed a new trial merely because the defense counsel had not diligently established
the mental incompetence of a material witness, other attorneys might follow suit. By
obtaining a new trial as a result of a subsequent finding of the witness' insanity, the
defense counsel's position will invariably
be enhanced at the expense of a successful
prosecution. At the new trial the prosecu:31Tompsett v. State, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 869 (1945).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407
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tor's case will have already been exposed
and the defense attorney would receive
the ultimate benefit resulting from his failure to perform effectively at the first trial.
Substantial justice can be best achieved
when the lawyer performs his moral, if not
legal, obligation by utilizing his best learning, ability and skill in his duties toward
his clients. : In this regard, all the available evidence and issues must be presented
to the jury. It appears that this was not
done in the present case and it is quite
possible that the Court granted a new trial
because of the counsel's inadvertence.
While the Court distinguished the Salemi
case from the instant decision, it failed to
clarify the incongruous result that a diligent defense precludes a new trial, while a
non-enthusiastic defense justifies a new
trial. Also to be clarified is the question of
whether a new trial would have been
granted if the trial court had informed the
jury of the material witness' mental condition when counsel failed to do so sufficiently.

(3d Cir. 1953).
32 Cf. Giaramita v. Flow Master Mach. Corp.,
234 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

3 See A.B.A. CANONS
Canon 15; WARVELLE,
§ 247 (2d ed. 1920).

Religious Belief Held
Irrelevant in ChildCustody Case

expressed is preferable to one in which
doubt, skepticism, or agnosticism is professed. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
reversed, holding that a religious belief
is not a relevant consideration in awarding
child custody unless that belief is inimical
to the welfare of the child. Welker v.
Welker, 129 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. Sup. Ct.
1964).
At common law the father had a paramount right to the custody of his minor

Although she attended a church, the
appellant-wife in a child-custody case considered herself an agnostic, since she had
some doubt as to the existence of a deity.
The trial court found both parties able
parents, but awarded custody to the husband, principally on the ground that a
home in which a firm faith in a deity is
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